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  The Origins and Early Development of Shi`a Islam

Chapter 8

The Reaction after Karbala

The martyrdom of Husayn was of great religious significance
and had a deep heart-searching after-effect upon the Shi'is,
giving a new turn to the mode and nature of the Shi'i
movement. The tragic fate of the grandson of the Prophet
stirred religious and moral sentiments, particularly among
those of the Ku~ fan followers of the House of the Prophet who
had so zealously asked Husayn to come to Iraq to guide them
on what they considered to be the path of God. But when
Husayn came to Iraq they did not or could not stand with
him in the hour of trial. Soon afterwards, however, they
realized that their inability, or rather weakness, had been the
cause of the tragedy. A deep sense of repentance set in,
provoking their religious conscience; and in order to expiate
their negligence and obtain God's forgiveness, they thought
they must make similar sacrifices. They believed that they
could only prove their real repentance by exposing themselves
to death while seeking vengeance for the blood of Husayn.
Hence they named themselves the Tawwabun (penitents) and
are known in Islamic history by this self-imposed title.
1 This
movement, as will be seen below, proved to be an important
step forward in the consolidation of Shi'i Islam.
The movement began under the leadership of five of the
oldest and most trusted associates of 'Ali, with a following of
a hundred diehard and devoted Shi'is of Kufa, none of whom
was below sixty years of age.
2 This age factor should
particularly be noted, as it indicates the maturity of their
religious thinking and behaviour. The five leaders of the
movement, Sulayman b. Surad al-Khuza`i, Al-Musayyab b.
Najaba al-Fazari; `Abd Allah b. Sa`d b. Nufayl al-Azdi, Abd
Allah b. Walin at-Tami, and Rifa`a b. Shaddad al-Bajali;
had always been in the forefront of all Shi'i activities in Kufa,
and were highly respected by the Shi'a for their sincerity of
purpose and unshaken devotion to the cause of the Ahl al-
Bayt. Similarly, the other hundred who joined these leaders
of the movement are described as "the most select from among
the followers of 'Ali".
3 Towards the end of 61/680 they held
their first meeting in the house of Sulayman b. Surad.
4 This
was the first opportunity for them to come out from their
hiding places and meet together, since the state of martial 18W
imposed on Kufa before the massacre at Karbala had now
been relaxed.
Detailed accounts of this first meeting and the passionate
speeches made by these five leaders are preserved for us by
the sources. The first to speak was Al-Musayyab b. Najaba al-
Fazari He said:

"We invited the son of the daughter of our Prophet to come to
Kufa to guide us on the right path, but when he responded to our
call we became greedy for our own lives until he was killed in our
midst. What excuse would we have before our Lord, and before
our Prophet when we meet him on the Day of Resurrection,
while his most beloved son, family, and progeny were massacred
in our midst. By God, there is no other way for us to expiate
ourselves for the sin except to kill all his murderers and their
associates or be killed. Perhaps by doing so our Lord may forgive
our sin. You must, therefore, now select someone from among
you as your leader, who can organize and mobilize you under his
command and proceed with the plan of seeking God's forgiveness
by taking the action which has been proposed."
5

Rifa`a b. Shaddad al-Bajali, another senior member of the
five leaders, then spoke, appealing passionately to the religious
sentiments of those present. After emphasizing further what
Al-Musayyab had said, he proposed:

"Let us give command of our affairs to Shaykh ash-Shi`a, the
companion of the Prophet, possessor of priority in Islam,
Sulayman b. Surad, the one praised for his intrepidity and for his
religion and the one who has been dependable and reliable in his
judiciousness and prudence (Hazm)."
6

The other three leaders named above spoke in the same
vein and seconded the proposal to chooose Sulayman as their
leader on the same grounds as mentioned by Rifa`a. It is
important to note that the qualifications for the leadership of
the movement, which was indeed dedicated to the Shi'i cause,
were companionship with the Prophet and priority or
precedence in Islam (sabiqa). This, like many other instances,
means that the main emphasis of the Shi'is was to enforce the
Islamic ideal, which they thought could only be achieved
through the Ahl al-Bayt, the people nearest to the Prophet.
Sulayman b. Surad, accepting the responsibility of leading
the movement, made a forceful speech in which he laid down
the severest standards required of those who wanted to
participate and emphasized that they should be ready to
sacrifice their lives for the noblest task ahead of them.
7 The
response from all those present was equally enthusiastic.
They pledged to seek God's pardon by fighting to the death
the killers of the grandson of the Prophet. In order to prove
the purity of their intentions many of them willed all of their
properties and possessions, except for arms, as Sadaqat for the
Muslims. Sulayman appointed 'Abd Allah b. Walin at-Taymi
as the treasurer to collect the contributions made by the Shi`a
and to use the money for the preparation of the mission.
8
With no loss of time Sulayman undertook the organization of
the movement. He entered into correspondence with Shi`i
leaders in other cities, namely with Sa'd b. Hudhayfa al-
Yaman in Al-Mada'in and Al-Muthanna b. Mukharriba al-
`Abdi in Basra. The movement, however, went on secretly for
about three years, increasing in numbers and strength and
waiting for an appropriate time and opportunity.
Circumstances took a sudden turn in favour of the
movement with the unexpected death of Yazid in 64/683,
encouraging the Tawwabun to come out in the open. Some of
the leading members urged Sulayman to rise publicly, Oust
`Amr b. Hurayth, deputy of 'Abd Allah b. Ziyad, from the
city, pursue those responsible for the blood of Husayn, and
call the people to support the Ahl al-Bayt Sulayman, however,
opted for a more restrained policy, pointing out that the
murderers of Husayn were in fact the ashraf al-qaba'il of
Kufa, who would have to pay for his blood. If the action were
immediately directed against them, they would become very
oppressive; and a revolt against them at this stage would
achieve nothing but disaster or even the complete destruction
of the Shi`is themselves. The purpose of avenging the blood
of Husayn would be lost. It would therefore be advisable, at
this stage, to intensify their propaganda campaign only
among their own Shi`is and among others throughout Kufa,
enlisting as much support as possible. He added that since
Yazid was now dead the people would join them more readily
and quickly.
9 Sulayman's suggestion prevailed and the
movement, so far a secret organization, came into the open
with an intensified campaign on a large scale. A number of
emissaries began ceaselessly working to invite people to join
the movement.
Abu Mikhnaf has preserved for us a speech of one of these
emissaries, 'Ubayd Allah al-Murri. It is reported from a man
of Muzayna, who said he heard it so many times that he
learned it by heart. The narrator further comments that he
had never seen anyone in his time more eloquent than Al-
Murri, and that the latter would never miss an opportunity to
preach if he happened to see a group of people. He would
begin by praising God and praying for His messenger. Then
he would say:

"God chose Muhammad from among all His creatures for His
Prophethood; He singled him out for all of His bounties. God
strengthened you by making you his followers and honoured you
with having faith in him; through Muhammad, God saved you
from the shedding of blood, and through him He made your
dangerous paths safe and peaceful. 'You were on the brink of the
pit of Fire and God saved you from it. Thus God makes His signs
clear to you. Perhaps you may be guided.' (Qur'an, III, 103). Has
God created anyone from the first to the last with greater right
over this Umma than its Prophet? Has the offspring of anyone
from among the Prophets or the Messengers or anyone else
greater right over this Umma than the offspring of its own
Prophet? No, by God, this has never been the case, nor will it ever
be. [O you people], you belong to God. Don't you see, don't you
understand what a crime you have committed against the son of
the daughter of your Prophet? Don't you see the people's violation
of his sanctity, their slackness towards him while he was lonely
and helpless, and their staining him with blood? They were
pulling him violently on the ground, not thinking of God in
regard of him nor his relationship to the Prophet. Eyes have
never before seen the like of this. By God, Husayn b. 'Ali, what a
betrayal of truth, forbearance, trust, nobility, and resolution: the
son of the first Muslim in Islam and the son of the daughter of the
Messenger of the Lord of the Worlds. Around him his defenders
were few, and his attackers were in multitudes. His enemies
killed him while his friends deserted him. Woe to the killers and
reproaches to the deserters! God will accept no excuse from those
who killed him, nor any argument from those who deserted him
except that the latter should sincerely repent before God and
fight against the killers and repudiate and eliminate the unjust
and the corrupt. Only then, perhaps, God may accept our
repentance and remove our guilt. We invite you to the Book of
God and the Sunna of his Prophet, to vengeance for the blood of
his [Prophet's] family and to war on the heretics and deviators
from the true religion. If we are killed, there is nothing better for
the pious than to be with their God; if we are successful, we will
restore power to the Ahl al-Bayt of our Prophet."
10

In all the preceding chapters dealing with the developments
from the time of the death of the Prophet till the death of
Husayn, the Shi'i doctrinal stand and their religio-political
aspirations have repeatedly been pointed out. If we recall the
arguments put forward by the supporters of 'All on the
occasions of the Saqifa and the Shura, the contents of the
letters written by Hasan to Mu'awiya and that of Husayn to
the Shi'is of Kufa and Basra, the pledges and statements
made by the supporters of Husayn at Karbala, and the
speeches delivered by the leaders of the Tawwabun in their
first meeting, Al-Murri's exhortations can be seen as nothing
other than an echoing of the same ideals. It would suffice to
say that throughout Al-Murri's speech the main emphasis is
laid on Husayn's relationship with the Prophet through
Fatima. The name of 'Ali appears only twice: the first time in
Husayn's name as "Husayn b. 'Ali", which was a usual way of
describing anyone, and the second when Husayn is mentioned
as "the son of the first Muslim", but even in this his position
as "the son of the daughter of our Prophet" is immediately
referred to. (Even at the time of the Saqifa and the Shura the
main emphasis was on 'Ali's nearness and close association
and relationship with the Prophet.) Thus the Tawwabun put
far more emphasis on the idea of succession to the Prophet by
blood than to 'Ali by blood. The main part of the speech, that
to kill the murderers of Husayn in order to avenge his blood
or be killed in order to expiate their failure in supporting
Husayn, and thus to seek God's forgiveness, was a new
dimension necessitated by the tragedy of Karbala. Finally, a
call to the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet, as has
been pointed out earlier, was an implicit rejection of the
precedent of the first three caliphs and thereby gave `Ali and
other Imams of the family of the Prophet exclusive authority
to interpret or reinterpret the Prophetic Sunna.
The campaign of the Tawwabun, however, succeeded in
gaining the support of i6,ooo Kufans,
11 since the situation in
Kufa was much more conducive to success now than ever
before. The sudden death of Yazid greatly weakened
Umayyad control of the province. The sickly son of Yazid,
Mu'awiya II, succeeded his father only six months before his
own death, and the old Marwan b. al-Hakam managed to
become the new Umayyad caliph. In Syria this led to a bloody
conflict between the two rival tribal groups of Kalb and Qays,
leaving the Umayyad capital in chaos and unable to maintain
its firm control over neighbouring Iraq. In the Hijaz, `Abd
Allah b. az-Zubayr, who had already put forward his own
claims to the caliphate and was taking advantage of Yazid's
death and of Syrian confusion and weakness, organized and
consolidated his power afresh and assumed the title of Amir
al-Mu'minin. The Umayyad governor and the strong man,
'Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad, who resided in Basra as the governor
of both Kufa and Basra, was expelled by a rebellion of the
inhabitants of the latter city and fled to Marwan in Syria.
The Kufans, on their part, ousted `Amr b. al-Hurayth, the
deputy of Ibn Ziyad in Kufa.
12 In the power vacuum, the
ashraf of Kufa promptly wrote to 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr to
take advantage of the situation and appoint his governor.
With the Shi'i groups emerging and the Syrian domination
weakening, the tribal and clan leaders of Kufa found it in
their interest to align themselves with Ibn az-Zubayr, who
represented the old Meccan-Qurayshite hegemony. Ibn az-Zubayr
immediately sent to Kufa 'Abd Allah b. Yazid al-
Ansari as his governor in charge of military affairs, and
Ibrahim b. Muhammad b. Talha in charge of the kharaj.
13
Now with the obstacles removed, Sulayman b. Surad
started final preparations for action. He wrote to the Shi'i
leaders in Al-Mada'in and Basra, calling them to be ready to
rise to avenge the blood of Husayn and to put right the affairs
which had gone wrong and had become unjust. He asked
them to meet at Nukhayla, outside Ku fa, on the first of Rabi'
II of the next year, 65/684. The Shi`i leader in Al-Mada'in,
Sa`d b. Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman, called in the Shi'a of that
region and read the letter to them and received an enthusiastic
response. The Shi`i leader in Basra, Al-Muthanna b. Mukharriba
al-`Abdi, also accepted the call and mobilized the
Shi'is of that city. The long texts of these letters,
14 which Abu
Mikhnaf has meticulously preserved for us, make extremely
useful and revealing reading for an understanding of the
religious sentiments and feelings and the doctrinal stand of
the Shi`a of this period. In essence these are much the same as
the speeches of the Tawwabun and that of Al-Murri
At this stage, Al-Mukhtar b. Abi `Ubayda ath-Thaqafi, also
a devoted follower of the Ahl al-Bayt, appeared in Ku fa. His
mission was the same as that of the Tawwabun insofar as the
revenge for the blood of Husayn and establishing the rights
of the Ahl al-Bayt were concerned, but differed in that he
wanted td achieve political authority through a more
organized military power. Mukhtar, therefore, tried to
persuade the Tawwabun not to take any hasty action and to
join him for a better chance of success. The Tawwabun
refused to join Mukhtar, as they had no wish to participate in
any doubtful adventure or to deviate from their main purpose
of atonement through sacrifice. They said that they would
follow only Shaykh ash-Shia Sulayman b. Surad.
15 Two
points in. Mukhtar's arguments with the Tawwabun are worth
noting here, since they reveal fundamental differences
between them. Mukhtar said that firstly Sulayman did not
know how to organize the military for warfare, nor did he
have any knowledge of diplomacy or politics; secondly,
Mukhtar had been appointed by the Mahdi, Muhammad b.
al-Hanafiya, as his deputy, confidant, and minister to avenge
the blood of Husayn.
16 (Muhammad b. al-Hanafiya was 'Ali's
third son from a Hanafite woman, and was not a descendant
of the Prophet.) The refusal of the Tawwabun to support
Mukhtar on these grounds indicates that they were interested
neither in purely military ventures nor in political affairs; nor
were they ready to accept even the eldest surviving son of 'Ali
as their Imam, as he was not the direct descendant of the
Prophet through Fatima. Thus the disagreement over
strategy or tactics was secondary to the disagreement over the
Imam.
Though the Tawwabun did not openly proclaim any
particular member of the Ahl al-Bayt as their Imam, there are
strong indications that they believed that the rightful Imam
was now Husayn's surviving son 'Ali, later known as Zayn al-
'Abidin. There are many factors that support this view.
Firstly, the very idea of the leadership based in the hereditary
sanctity, which attracted the Arabs of Shi'i tendency, was still
confined to the progeny of Muhammad through Fatima; it
had been transferred from Hasan to Husayn and not to any
other member of the Hashimite clan. It has repeatedly been
pointed out in what we have discussed so far that only rarely
are Hasan and Husayn described as the sons of 'Ali; they
were much more frequently referred to as "the son of the
daughter of our Prophet". Secondly, the name of Muhammad
b. al-i;1anaflya had not been cited at the time when the
Tawwabun first held their meeting soon after Karbala in
61/680; Mukhtar arrived in Kufa after the death of Yazid in
64/684 and began his campaign in the name of Ibn al-
Hanafiya. Thus the name of Ibn al-Hanafiya appeared for
the first time four years later, when the Tawwabun were
almost ready for action. Thirdly, even Mukhtar, who was the
main progenitor of Ibn al-Hanafiya's leadership, first approached
'Ali b. al-Husayn, as will be seen later, and only
when the latter refused to involve himself in any public
movement did Mukhtar turn to Ibn al-Hanafiya and
ingratiate himself with his name.
Since 'Ali b. al-Husayn himself refused to make any public
claims or to allow any claims to be made on his behalf, the
Tawwabun refrained from mentioning his name. Nevertheless,
since certain vague references made by the Tawwabun
during their campaign, such as the verses composed by their
poet, 'Abd Allah b. al-Ahmar, in which he speaks of "a caller
who invited them to salvation",
17 obviously refer to an Imam,
and since the name of Ibn al-Hanafiya would not be associated
with the imamate for another three years, the reference must
have been to 'Ali b. al-Husayn. This is based on the fact that
the Shi'a of Kufa had already established a precedent when
they proclaimed Hasan b. 'Ali, and not any other member of
the Hashimite house, as the successor of his father. It seems
also that the Tawwabun, after their sad experience vis--vis
Husayn, decided not to put forward `Ali b. al-Husayn's name
for the leadership until they had been successful in throwing
off Umayyad rule in Kufa or else sacrificing themselves in
active repentance for their failure in carrying out their duties
with regard to Husayn.
The main body of the Tawwabun, however, refused to join
Mukhtar, though at least 2,000 of these who had registered
their names with Sulayman did switch over to him, obviously
in the hope of better political prospects.
As the time for action was approaching, Sulayman b. Surad
and other leaders of the movement were putting more and
more emphasis on disavowing any intention of political
conquest and discouraged those who might have joined them
for material benefits or worldly gains. According to their
plan, in the beginning of Rabi' II, 65/November, 684, they
raised their call for "revenge for the blood of Husayn (ya
latha'rat al-Husayn)" and set out on their mission. They
gathered at Nukhayla, a suburb of Kufa, from where they
had to march against the forces of `Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad, the
Umayyad governor who had been responsible for the
massacre at Karbala. The rigorous standards set by Sulayman
b. Surad, however, proved to be too much for the majority of
the volunteers: of the 16,000 who had registered themselves,
only 4,000 came to the rendezvous at Nukhayla. The governor
of Ibn al-Zubayr, `Abd Allah b. Yazid, tried to dissuade them
from carrying out their plans and suggested to Sulayman that
he wait until the former could prepare an army to join them.
They refused to change their plan or to accept his help,
18 as
it would have compromised their whole position. Their
intention was to avenge the blood of Husayn, to establish the
Shi`i imamate or to die. They were prepared to die rather
than to have `Abd Allah b. Yazid's non-Shi`i support. If they
had accepted it they would have merely been joining one
political faction, the supporters of Ibn az-Zubayr, against
another, the Umayyads. Now, with the Tawwabun volunteers
reduced from 16,000 to 4,000, they could hardly hope for any
success except in fighting to the death and seeking atonement
and repentance. They were determined to carry out their
pledges to themselves.
They spent three days in prayer and remembrance of God
at Nukhayla. The Shi`a from Al-Mada'in and Basra had not
yet arrived, and some of those at Nukhayla wanted to await
their arrival, but Sulayman insisted that they should proceed
without further delay. He told them:

"There are two kinds of people. There are those who want the
benefits of the hereafter, who hurry towards it and do not seek
any worldly reward; and there are those whose acts are motivated
by worldly gains. You are going for the benefits of the life
hereafter: remember God in abundance in any situation and you
will soon attain nearness to God and receive His best reward by
fighting in His way and being patient in all calamities. Let us
then proceed to our goal."
19

According to Baladhuri the people responded from all
sides, "We are not seeking the world and we have not come
out for it."
20 But in the morning another 1,000 were missing
from his army. Sulayman was not discouraged and merely
said that it was better that such people should go.
From Nukhayla the Tawwabun first went to Karbala to the
grave of Husayn, where they gave themselves up to wild and
unprecedented expressions of grief, weeping and wailing for
the suffering and tragic death of the grandson of the
Prophet.
21 Welihausen points out that this was the first
incidence of the glorification of the grave of Husayn and was
purely Arabian in its character and nature since the Arabs
were used to glorifying the Black Stone fixed in the Kaeba.
22
After spending a day and night in mourning they left the
grave of Husayn.
When they reached the village of Qarqisiya, the fifth stage
from Karbala on the road to the Syrian border, they were
generously entertained by the chief of the village, Zufar b. al-
Harith, who informed them that `Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad, with
a 30,000-man Syrian army, had reached `Ayn al-Warda. The
chieftain provided Sulayman with plenty of provisions and
advised him further about 'Ubayd Allah's army and gave
him the names of other leaders who were with him. Zufar also
told Sulayman that he, along with his people, would fight the
-Syrians if the Tawwabun would stay with him and use
Qarqisiya as a base. But Sulayman did not agree.
The Tawwabun ultimately reached 'Ayn al-Warda and
engaged the Syrians fiercely, shouting, "Paradise! Paradise
for the Turabites!"
23 The battle lasted for three days, and the
Tawwabun fought with unprecedented resolution, determination,
and zeal. Even though greatly outnumbered, on the
first day they inflicted heavy losses on the Syrians. On the
second day, however, their own losses began to tell and their
leaders fell one after the other. The first to be killed was
Sulayman b. Surad himself, followed by Al-Musayyab b.
Najaba, `Abd Allah b. Sa'd b. Nufayl, and then 'Abd Allah b:
Walin at-Taymi, each taking the leadership and the Tawwabun
standard in succession one after the other. By the end of
the third day the majority of the Tawwabun had fulfilled their
pledge to sacrifice their lives in the name of Husayn. The
only surviving leader, Rifa`a b. Shaddad, advised the handful
of survivors to return, and while on their way back they were
met by the Shi`is of Al-Mada'in and Basra, who had been
coming to join them, but now turned back to Qarqisiya.
24
In an attempt to analyse the Tawwabun movement, a few
points are conspicuous. Firstly, all the 3,000 Tawwabun who
fought in the battle were Arabs there were no mawali among
them.
25 It was Mukhtar who first mobilized the Persian
mawali in active participation, thus giving the Shi`i movement
a wider appeal. Secondly, among these 3,000 Tawwabun,
though the majority were from South Arabian or Yemeni
tribes, the northern and central Arabian tribes of Mudar and
Rabi`a were by no means under-represented. In fact, the
second in command, Al-Musayyab b. Najaba, was from
Mudar. Looking at the names of some of the Tawwabun as
given by the sources,
26 one finds that many of the chief tribes
of the Arabs of both Yemenis and Nizaris were well
represented. Thus Shi`i feelings were not confined to any
single group of the Arabs. Thirdly, the penitent army
included a very large number of the original qurra' of Kufa,
27
all the five leaders being among them.
All of these facts, however, indicate two fundamental
points. Firstly, the Shi`i movement till the time of the
Tawwabun (65/684) was still purely Arabian in character and
totally untouched by non-Arab elements, doctrinal or other-
wise. And secondly, the movement of the Tawwabun was
totally a religious affair. Husayn himself, when he met Yazid's
army, was fully aware of his dignity as the grandson of the
Prophet, as well as the son of `Ali, and the Tawwabun by their
action were certainly combining loyalty to `Ali with loyalty to
Muhammad himself, and thus were taking the matter strictly
as a religious issue. Finally, if we compare the feeling and the
expressions of those of the Shi`a who gave up their lives with
Husayn at Karbala, as explained in the previous chapter,
with the speeches and expressions made by the Tawwabun,
recorded earlier in this chapter, we find that the arguments
and sentiments of both groups were based on the same
religious principles.
But there is a great difference between the two, however.
At Karbala the presence of Husayn himself was a great
personal obligation on the Shi`a who fought and were killed
with him. In the case of the Tawwabun there was no personal
binding force which could keep them zealous enough to make
them die except a strong feeling of duty and a deep sense of
religious obligation. Thus the Tawwabun pushed Shi`ism
another step forward towards an independent and self-
sustaining existence.


Notes to Chapter 8

1 Baladhuri, V, pp.204 ff.; Tabari, II, p.497; Mas'udi, Muruj,
III, p.93; Welihausen, Die religios politischen Oppositionsparteien im
alten Islam trans. 'Abd ar-Rahman Badawi, Ahzab al-mu'arada as-
siyasiya al-diniya fi sadr al-Islam (Cairo, 1968), p. 189
2 Tabari, II, p. 498; Welihausen, loc. cit.
3 Tabari, II, p. 498; Baladhuri, V, pp.204 f.
4 Tabari, II, p.497; Baladhuri, loc. cit.
5 Tabari, II, p. 498; Baladhuri, V, p.205
6 Tabari, II, p.499; Baladhuri, loc. cit.
7 Tabari, II, pp.499 f.; Baladhuri, V, pp.205 f.
8 Tabari, loc. cit.; Baladhuri, loc. cit.
9 Tabari, II, pp. 506-7
10 Tabari, II, pp. 507-8
11 Baladhuri, V, p. 2o8
12 Baladhuri, V. p. 207
13 Baladhuri, V, p.207; Tabari, II, p.509
14 Tabari, II, pp.502-s
15 Baladhuri, V, p.207; Tabari, II, p.509
16 Baladhuri, loc. cit.; Tabari, loc. cit.
17 Mas'udi, Muruj ; III, p.93
18 Tabari, II, pp.543 f.; Baladhuri, V, p.209
19 Tabari, II, p.545
20 Baladhuri, V, p.209
21 Baladhuri, loc. cit.; Tabari, II, p. 546; Welihausen, Ahzab,
p.194
22 Ahzab, p.194. Cf. Tabari, II, p. 546; Baladhuri, V, p.209
23 Mas'udi, Muruj, III, p.94. "Turabites": reference to Abu
Turab, 'Ali's kunya.
24 See the detailed account of 'Ayn al-Warda in Baladhuri, V,
pp.210 f.; Tabari, II, pp. 558 ff; Mas'udi, Muruj, III, p.94
25 Welihausen, Ahzab, p.194
26 See Tabari, II, pp.497, 559, 566, 599, 601; Baladhuri, V,
pp.207 ff.; Welihausen, loc. cit.
27 Welihausen, loc. cit.

 

 

Index